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Indian Country Complexities and the 




In March of 2016, U.S. Senator for New York Kirsten 
Gillibrand and U.S. Senator for New Jersey Cory Booker 
took to the realm of internet social media to share several 
videos that vigorously advocated for the need to expand 
research into the medical effects of marijuana. The social 
media news outlet, ATTN:, produced and shared a video 
featuring the Senators’ policy positions on medical 
marijuana.1 During the course of two weeks, the video racked 
up nearly two and one-half million views.2 In the video, 
Senator Gillibrand proclaims that it is “outrageous that our 
government is standing in the way of these patients getting 
medicine.”3 The video interviewer posits that “acting [Drug 
Enforcement Agency] Chief Chuck Rosenberg called medical 
marijuana a joke.”4 Senator Gillibrand says that from her 
perspective, she does not “believe [Rosenberg] has done his 
 
† University at Buffalo School of Law, J.D. expected 2017. I thank the Buffalo 
Law Review for its commitment to publishing student work.  
 1.  ATTN:, Sen. Booker and Sen. Gillibrand on Medical Marijuana, 
FACEBOOK (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/attn/videos/100541057949
4401/. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
4.   Id. 
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homework.”5 
The second video shared by ATTN: tallied more than one 
million views in a matter of days.6 In this video, Senator 
Gillibrand derides the notion that marijuana is still 
classified as a Schedule I drug. Senator Gillibrand describes 
an outmoded way of thinking about marijuana: “It’s stuck in 
the sixties. People wanted to demonize this as a hippie drug 
that had no value.”7 Senator Gillibrand then describes a 
typical response that she receives from those within the 
federal government who maintain that marijuana has no 
valid medical use: “They’ll say, ‘There’s not a body of research 
that shows the medical effects in U.S. literature.’”8 To which 
Senator Gillibrand ironically retorts, “Well, surprise, 
surprise. It’s a Schedule I drug. Of course there’s not a body 
of research. Because you’ve precluded that research from 
being done. It’s a catch-22.”9 
Senators Gillibrand and Booker’s appearances in the 
videos show the clearly discordant positions within the 
federal government regarding marijuana policy. Even during 
the political tumult of 2016, a moment when bipartisanship 
seemed to be at its lowest ebb, a bipartisan bill, which 
recognized that marijuana has an accepted medical use, was 
introduced by Gillibrand and Booker, both Democrats, along 
with Rand Paul, a Republican senator from Kentucky.10  
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  ATTN:, The Federal Ban on Medical Marijuana Research Is Outrageous, 
FACEBOOK (Mar. 9. 2016), http://www.facebook.com/attn/videos/101001240903
4218. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Senators Gillibrand, Booker, and Paul are surely strange political 
bedfellows, but that speaks to the consensus building nature and good sense that 
attends their current position on marijuana policy. The Compassionate Access, 
Research Expansion and Respect States (CARERS) Act would amend the 
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Medical marijuana policy developments represent just a 
small fragment of the budding policy issues on this matter. 
While the federal government is still trying to warm up to 
the idea of medical research on the benefits of marijuana, in 
the state governments, particularly evidenced by the recent 
string of ballot measures approved by voters, there is an 
obvious trend toward the much more progressive policy of 
recreational marijuana use.11 Although he has done so with 
great prudence, even President Obama has spoken openly 
about the inadequacies of the current federal marijuana 
policies that are being outstripped by more progressive state 
policies.12 As a new administration took control in early 
2017, during the Senate’s attorney general confirmation 
hearings for Jeff Sessions, the conflict between state and 
federal marijuana laws arose as a topic of concern for 
Senators on both sides of the aisle.13 
As if the complexities of the intersection between 
divergent federal and state policies were not enough to 
contend with, Indian tribes and Indian nations are taking 
actions to establish their own marijuana policies and 
programs. As tribal governments begin to enter the 
marijuana industry, the clash of jurisdictions over the 
legality of marijuana becomes even more complicated. First, 
an Indian tribe on its own territory has its own set of 
 
Controlled Substances Act to allow for greater ease in medical marijuana 
financing and research. See Medical Marijuana, KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, 
http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/issues/medical-marijuana (last visited Feb. 10, 
2017). 
 11.  See infra Section I.A for a look at the recent measures legalizing the use 
of recreational marijuana in state and local governments.  
 12.  See, e.g., David Remnick, Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with 
Barack Obama, NEW YORKER (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-david-remnick.  
 13.  Particularly the questions posed by Senator Leahy, a Democrat from 
Vermont, and Senator Lee, a Republican from Utah. Attorney General 
Confirmation Hearing, Day 1 Part 2, C-SPAN (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?420932-101/attorney-general-nominee-jeff-sessions-testifies-
confirmation-hearing (relevant questioning occurs between 1:18:30 and 1:25:52).  
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marijuana policies and concerns, and perhaps the tribe 
wants to pursue a medical or recreational marijuana 
program. Second, that Indian reservation is nestled within 
the boundaries of a state that has its own body of state law 
that addresses marijuana, which it may or may not be able 
to apply to the Indian territory. Its applicability depends on 
a variety of different factors affecting state jurisdiction in 
Indian country. Moreover, the state and any Indian territory 
in the state are both situated under the final capstone of 
jurisdictional complexity where the overarching federal 
policy makes marijuana illegal in all forms.  
This Comment evaluates the current status of marijuana 
programs in Indian country amid the tangled nexus of 
governmental powers and frequently inconsistent policies 
regarding marijuana at the federal, state, and tribal levels. 
Part I sets forth federal narcotics policy as it relates to 
marijuana, how that federal policy has been operating in 
tandem with states that are ever-more-frequently legalizing 
marijuana at the state and local level, and how a similar set 
of considerations is applied in Indian country.  
Part II explains common concepts relating to federal 
Indian law, tribal sovereignty, and how the Wilkinson Memo 
has been applied in relation to a variety of different tribes. 
Part II also offers a cursory overview of jurisdictional 
transfers of authority in Indian country from the federal 
government to the state governments. This Comment uses 
the tribal, state, and federal interactions surrounding the 
Indian gaming industry as a lens through which to view the 
jurisdictional complexities in Indian country, and how those 
complexities are reflected in the context of tribal marijuana 
enterprises.  
Part III suggests that tribal governments ought to be 
able to develop marijuana programs that comply with federal 
enforcement priorities and that in cases of such compliance, 
state governments that have legalized marijuana in some 
form should not interfere with tribal marijuana programs 
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within state boundaries. I also contend that some of the 
structures that have been imposed on Indian tribes and 
Indian nations in the context of Indian gaming should not be 
considered as an option for managing the competing 
interests of the states and tribes in the development of any 
future marijuana programs. 
I. FEDERAL POLICY CREATES A DUBIOUS FRAMEWORK FOR 
MARIJUANA DEVELOPMENTS AT THE STATE, LOCAL, 
AND TRIBAL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
A.  The Current State of Federal Policy on Marijuana 
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is a federal statute 
that sets out drug policy in the United States.14 The CSA 
classifies drugs into five categories, namely Schedules I-V.15 
Schedule I contains the drugs that the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) considers to be the most 
dangerous types of drugs.16 Factors such as whether the drug 
has an acceptable medical use; and whether the drug has a 
great potential to be abused or to create dependence are 
given weight in determining the class in which a drug is 
placed.17 For example, the CSA contains the following 
criteria for Schedule I drugs:  
(1) SCHEDULE I.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse. 
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical 
use in treatment in the United States. 
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other 
 
 14.  21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012). 
 15.  Id. § 812. 
 16.  See Drug Scheduling, DEA, http://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2016).  
 17.  See id. 
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substance under medical supervision.18 
It is surprising then to find marijuana among the list of 
drugs classified by the federal government as Schedule I.19 
For a point of comparison, cocaine and methamphetamine 
are classified in a less dangerous category as Schedule II 
drugs.20 As a foundational matter it is important to establish 
that, as per the CSA, marijuana is illegal everywhere in the 
United States until Congress acts to change the law. 
Nevertheless, at the state and local level, the current 
political and cultural trends in the United States seem to 
imagine marijuana as quite distinct from the 
characterizations associated with Schedule I drugs. In 1996, 
California was the first state where voters passed a medical 
marijuana ballot initiative.21 In the years since then, many 
states have allowed for the medical use of marijuana.22 
Currently, twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, 
Guam, and Puerto Rico allow medical marijuana.23 During 
the 2016 election season, several states offered their voters 
the opportunity to weigh in on medical marijuana initiatives. 
 
 18.  21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). 
 19.  See id. § 812(c). 
 20.  Id. A Schedule II drug is categorized as such because the drug “has a high 
potential for abuse,” its abuse “may lead to severe psychological or physical 
dependence,” and “has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the 
United States.” Id. § 812(b). 
 21.  The ballot initiative was referred to as California Proposition 215 and 
was alternatively called the Compassionate Use Act of 1996. CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).  
 22.  See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 23.  Id.  
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Voters in Arkansas,24 Florida,25 Montana,26 and North 
Dakota27 chose to move medical marijuana forward in their 
states.28  
The trend toward legalization at the state level is not 
merely limited to medical uses of marijuana. Prior to the 
 
 24.  In Arkansas, voters approved Issue 6, a ballot measure to allow patients 
with certain conditions to use medical cannabis with a doctor’s approval. 
Overview of Arkansas’s Medical Marijuana Amendment, MARIJUANA POLICY 
PROJECT, https://www.mpp.org/states/arkansas/overview-arkansass-medical-
marijuana-amendment (last visited Mar. 16, 2017). 
 25.  In Florida, voters approved Amendment 2 to establish a comprehensive 
medical marijuana program. Florida Medical Marijuana Legislation, 
Amendment 2, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Medical_
Marijuana_Legalization,_Amendment_2_(2016) (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). The 
full text of Amendment 2 can be viewed online. Constitutional Amendment 
Petition Form: Use of Marijuana for Debilitating Medical Conditions, FLA. DEP’T 
ST., (Jan. 9, 2015), http://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/fulltext/pdf/504
38-3.pdf.  
 26.  In Montana, medical marijuana has been legal since 2004, but voters in 
2016 chose to greatly expand the medical marijuana program in the state. MONT. 
SECRETARY ST., http://mtelectionresults.gov/resultsSW. aspx?type=BQ&map=
CTY (last updated Dec. 13, 2016).  
 27.  Voters in North Dakota approved Measure 5, also known as the North 
Dakota Compassionate Care Act. North Dakota Medical Marijuana: Voters Say 
Yes After Lawmakers Said No, CANNABIST (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://www.thecannabist.co/2016/11/08/north-dakota-medical-marijuana-vote-
measure-5-election-2016/66822/. The full text of Measure 5 can be viewed online. 
Initiated Constitutional Measure No. 5, N.D. SECRETARY ST., https://vip.sos.nd.
gov/pdfs/Measures%20Info/2016%20General/Measure%205.pdf (last visited Feb. 
10, 2017).  
 28.  For an overview of the marijuana related ballot initiatives in the 2016 
election, see Alicia Wallace, Definitive Guide to Marijuana on the 2016 Ballot: 
Recreational & Medical Initiatives, CANNABIST (July 14, 2016), 
http://www.thecannabist.co/2016/07/14/definitive-guide-us-states-voting-
recreational-medical-marijuana-inovember-2016-election/58063/.  
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2016 election, Alaska,29 Colorado,30 Oregon,31 and 
Washington32 already allowed recreational use of marijuana. 
At the city government level, even in the stomping grounds 
of our Nation’s federal leaders, voters approved a 2014 ballot 
initiative legalizing recreational marijuana in the District of 
Columbia.33 In the November 2016 election, state voters 
approved measures allowing for the recreational use of 
 
 29.  ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.38.010–17.38.900, 43.61.010–43.61.030 (2014). The 
official ballot title was Ballot Measure No. 2—13PSUM An Act to Tax and 
Regulate the Production, Sale, and Use of Marijuana. Alaska Marijuana 
Legalization, Ballot Measure 2 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Alaska_Marijuana_Legalization,_Ballot_Measure_2_(2014) (last visited Mar. 7, 
2017). 
 30.  COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16. The ballot measure was referred to as 
Amendment 64 and culminated in an amendment to the state Constitution. 
Colorado Marijuana Legalization Initiative, Amendment 64 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Amendmen
t_64_(2012) (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
 31.  Measure 91: Text of Measure, OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/
olcc/marijuana/Documents/Measure91.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). The ballot 
measure was known as the Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Marijuana and 
Industrial Hemp Act of 2014. Oregon Legalized Marijuana Initiative, Measure 91, 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Legalized_Marijuana_Initiative,_ 
Measure_91_(2014) (last visited Mar. 7. 2017). 
 32.  Initiative Measure No. 502, WASH. SECRETARY ST. (July 8, 2011), 
http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/i502.pdf; see also Washington 
Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Marijuana_Legalization_and_Regulation,_I
nitiative_502_(2012) (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
 33.  See Bill Chappell, Marijuana Votes: Oregon and D.C. Legalize; Florida 
Says No to Medical, NPR (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2014/11/04/361533318/marijuana-on-the-ballot-d-c-voters-ok-legalization; 
Board of Elections Notice of Publication: Initiative Measure No. 71, Legalization 
of Possession of Minimal Amounts of Marijuana for Personal Use Act of 2014 
(Mar. 25, 2014), http://dcregs.dc.gov/Gateway/NoticeHome.aspx? 
NoticeID=4827610. 
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marijuana in California,34 Maine,35 Massachusetts,36 and 
Nevada.37 All told, following the 2016 election, there are 
eight states that allow recreational use of marijuana, and the 
various election results are seen as an indication that 
marijuana legalization at the state level is gaining steam.38 
There is a clear incongruence between the federal 
government’s continued and protracted classification of 
 
 34.  California has long been a leader in marijuana policy, and voters 
approved Proposition 64, the Adult Use of Marijuana Act, which allows legal 
recreational use. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 12 (2016), 
http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/2016-complete-sov.pdf; Full 
Initiative Text, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT CAL., 
https://www.regulatecalifornia.com/about/full-initiative-text/ (last visited Feb. 
13, 2017).  
 35.  In a closely contested election, Maine voters said yes to Question 1, 
effectively ending the prohibition on marijuana and creating a regulatory scheme 
similar to the way the state regulates alcohol. Darren Fishell & Michael 
Shepherd, Maine Voters Narrowly Endorse Legal Marijuana, but Opponents 
Weigh Recount, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016), http://bangordailynews.com/
2016/11/09/politics/elections/maine-voters-narrowly-endorse-legal-marijuana/. 
The full text of the Marijuana Legalization Act is available online. Marijuana 
Legalization Act, REGULATE ME., http://www.regulatemaine.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/initiative-text.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
 36.  Voters in Massachusetts approved recreational marijuana use by voting 
yes to Question 4. Ballot Questions, SECRETARY COMMONWEALTH MASS., 
http://electionstats.state.ma.us/ballot_questions/search/year_from:1972/year_to:
2016 (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). The full text of The Regulation and Taxation of 
Marijuana Act is available online. An Initiative Petition for a Law Relative to the 
Regulation and Taxation of Marijuana, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/
ago/docs/government/2015-petitions/15-27.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
 37.  Voters in Nevada approved Question 2, the Initiative to Regulate 
Marijuana Like Alcohol. Nevada Voters Say ‘YES’ on Question 2 to Regulate 
Marijuana Like Alcohol, REGULATE MARIJUANA LIKE ALCOHOL (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.regulatemarijuanainnevada.org/nevada-voters-say-yes-question-2-
regulate-marijuana-like-alcohol/. The full text of the Initiative to Regulate and 
Tax Marijuana is available online. Full Initiative Text, REGULATE MARIJUANA 
LIKE ALCOHOL, https://www.regulatemarijuanainnevada.org/full-initiative-text/ 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2017).  
 38.  See Alicia Wallace, A Greener America: Marijuana’s Big Statement in 
Election 2016, CANNABIST (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.thecannabist.co/
2016/11/08/election-2016-marijuana-results-states-recreational-medical/66994/. 
ADORNETTO 65.2  
338 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65 
marijuana as a Schedule I substance and the now wide-
ranging acceptance of marijuana, in both medical and 
recreational capacities, in the state and local governments.39 
In 2013, in response to state ballot initiatives legalizing 
marijuana in some form, the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) issued a memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy 
Attorney General (Cole Memo), which offered guidance to all 
U.S. Attorneys about federal enforcement activity and 
priorities.40 The Cole Memo carefully asserts that 
Congress has determined that marijuana is a dangerous drug and 
that the illegal distribution and sale of marijuana is a serious crime 
that provides a significant source of revenue to large-scale criminal 
enterprises, gangs, and cartels. The [DOJ] is committed to enforce-
ment of the [Controlled Substances Act] consistent with those de-
terminations.41  
The Cole Memo explains that the DOJ is “committed to 
using its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to 
address the most significant threats in the most effective, 
consistent, and rational way.”42 To that end, the Cole Memo 
provides a series of “enforcement priorities” that the federal 
government considers to be important as it determines how, 
and to what extent, it should enforce its marijuana policy.43 
Namely, the enforcement priorities explain that the DOJ is 
most focused on the following eight factors: 
[p]reventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; 
[p]reventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to 
 
 39.  As evidenced by the ATTN: videos, even within the legislative branch of 
the federal government, there are a great variety of opinions about the validity 
of marijuana use. See supra notes 1–9. 
 40.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., 
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING 
MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
3052013829132756857467.pdf [hereinafter COLE MEMO].  
 41.  Id. at 1. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
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criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; 
[p]reventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal 
under state law in some form to other states; 
[p]reventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as 
a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other 
illegal activity; 
[p]reventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and 
distribution of marijuana; 
[p]reventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse 
public health consequences associated with marijuana use; 
[p]reventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the 
attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by 
marijuana production on public lands; and 
[p]reventing marijuana possession or use on federal property.44 
This list of enforcement priorities serves as “guidance to 
[DOJ] attorneys and law enforcement to focus their 
enforcement resources and efforts, including prosecution, on 
persons or organizations whose conduct interferes with any 
one or more of these priorities.”45  
The Cole Memo describes the federal government’s 
tendency to rely on state and local law to deal with marijuana 
activity that does not implicate any of the eight enforcement 
priorities.46 Thus, a single individual who possesses a bit of 
marijuana for his own personal use47 would not be a matter 
on which the federal government would spend its own 
enforcement and prosecutorial resources, but rather it would 
expect that state or local law would serve as the body of 
narcotics law that would capture and correct the behavior 
 
 44.  Id. at 1–2. 
 45.  Id. at 2. 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  This assumes, of course, that this individual does not use or possess 
marijuana while standing on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, or offer a joint to 
a child, or go for a joy ride while under the influence, or enrich El Chapo’s coffers, 
etc., in violation of any of the Cole Memo enforcement priorities. 
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through state or local enforcement mechanisms.48 Now, as 
many state and local governments have begun to pass ballot 
initiatives and other forms of legislation to allow for 
marijuana activity, including possession, distribution, sale, 
and use of marijuana, the structure that the federal 
government has traditionally relied on for enforcing its 
marijuana policy against small-time personal users is left 
bereft of any body of law to capture that small-time use.49 Of 
course, the federal government could enforce the CSA and its 
marijuana policy against an individual marijuana user, but, 
as noted by the Cole Memo, that is not an effective or 
desirable use of federal enforcement, investigative, or 
prosecutorial resources.50 Thus, in states where marijuana 
has been legalized in some form, and the state has also 
“implemented strong and effective regulatory and 
enforcement systems to control the cultivation, distribution, 
sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in compliance 
with those laws and regulations is less likely to threaten 
federal priorities set forth above.”51 The federal government 
will make these determinations on a case-by-case basis.52  
The primary inquiry in any federal enforcement action is 
“whether the conduct at issue implicates one or more of the 
enforcement priorities listed above.”53 Thus, if a state 
legalizes marijuana and hopes to remain free from federal 
enforcement activity, the state should be sure to enact a 
rigorous regulatory scheme that ensures that the state’s 
marijuana policy does not (1) make it easier for kids to get 
their hands on marijuana; (2) fund criminals; (3) allow 
 
 48.  COLE MEMO, supra note 40, at 2.  
 49.  See id. 
 50.  See id. at 2–3. 
 51.  Id. at 3. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
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marijuana to drift into another state where it is still illegal; 
(4) allow more dangerous drugs to be trafficked under the 
guise of marijuana distribution; (5) involve the use of guns; 
(6) encourage drugged driving; (7) allow marijuana to grow 
on public lands; or (8) increase the likelihood that individuals 
will bring marijuana onto federal property.54 
The Cole Memo is a product of the Obama 
administration’s DOJ marijuana policy. In the wake of the 
2016 presidential election, during his senate confirmation 
hearings, Jeff Sessions explained that he understands that 
federal marijuana enforcement is a “problem of resources for 
the federal government.”55 Sessions described the DOJ’s 
policy under the Cole Memo: “The Department of Justice 
under Lynch and Holder set forth some policies that they 
thought were appropriate to define what cases should be 
prosecuted in states that have legalized [marijuana] at least 
in some fashion.”56 Senator Leahy asked if Sessions agreed 
with the guidelines set forth by the DOJ. Sessions replied: 
I think some of them are truly valuable in evaluating cases, but fun-
damentally the criticism I think that was legitimate is that they 
may not have been followed. Using good judgment about how to han-
dle these cases will be a responsibility of mine. I know it won’t be 
an easy decision, but I will try to do my duty in a fair and just way.57 
 This statement seems to be Sessions’s tepid 
acknowledgment that the guidelines set forth by the Cole 
Memo are, for now, a useful way to determine when and how 
the federal government should utilize its limited resources to 
enforce the CSA against those acting in accordance with 
state laws.  
 
 
 54.  See id. at 1–3.  
 55.  Attorney General Confirmation Hearing, Day 1 Part 2, supra note 13 
(relevant questioning occurs between 1:18:30 and 1:25:52). 
 56.  Id. (relevant questioning occurs between 1:18:30 and 1:25:52). 
 57.  Id. (relevant questioning occurs between 1:18:30 and 1:25:52). 
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B.  What Do the CSA, the Cole Memo, and State Marijuana 
Laws Have to Do with Indian Country?  
Shortly after the Cole Memo set forth the eight 
enforcement priorities for state and local governments, tribal 
governments asked the DOJ whether those same priorities 
applied to the DOJ’s enforcement of marijuana activity on 
tribal lands.58 In response to those inquiries, the DOJ 
released a policy statement from Monty Wilkinson, Director 
of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys entitled “Policy 
Statement Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian Country” 
(Wilkinson Memo).59 The Wilkinson Memo provides 
“guidance on the enforcement of the [CSA] on tribal lands by 
the United States Attorneys’ offices.”60 The Wilkinson Memo 
takes the eight enforcement priorities listed in the Cole 
Memo and makes them applicable to federal enforcement 
actions regarding marijuana activity in Indian country.61 
The technical definition of Indian country is: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation, 
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the 
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired 
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a 
state, and 
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
 
 58.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE DIR., MEMORANDUM: POLICY 




 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. at 1–2. 
 61.  See id. at 2 (“The eight priorities in the Cole Memorandum will guide 
United States Attorneys’ marijuana enforcement efforts in Indian Country, 
including in the event that sovereign Indian Nations seek to legalize the 
cultivation or use of marijuana in Indian Country.”). 
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extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.62 
More simply, the term Indian country means “the 
territory set aside for the operation of special rules allocating 
governmental power among Indian tribes, the federal 
government, and the states.”63 As tribal governments move 
forward with efforts to develop their own bodies of law in 
relation to marijuana, they are subject to the CSA and the 
DOJ’s discretion the same way that a state or local 
government would be.  
The Cole and Wilkinson Memos do offer some guidance 
regarding the federal government’s marijuana policy. 
However, even though both Memos explain that the federal 
government will focus its attention by first considering 
whether any of the eight enforcement priorities are 
implicated, the final sentence of the Cole Memo carefully 
preserves the federal government’s prerogative to enforce or 
prosecute at its discretion: “nothing herein precludes 
investigation or prosecution, even in the absence of any one 
of the factors listed above, in particular circumstances where 
investigation and prosecution otherwise serves an important 
federal interest.”64 This portion of the Cole Memo is quoted 
and reasserted in its entirety in the Wilkinson Memo.65 The 
important takeaway from the Memos is that the CSA is still 
controlling federal law and marijuana is still illegal under 
federal law. Therefore, the DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s Office 
may interpret the eight enforcement priorities and 
determine at their own discretion whether a particular 
marijuana activity warrants federal action. 
Now that the groundwork for the federal enforcement 
priorities of marijuana policy in Indian country is set forth, 
 
 62.  18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).  
 63.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.01 (Nell Jessup Newton 
ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].  
 64.  COLE MEMO, supra note 40, at 4. 
 65.  WILKINSON MEMO, supra note 58, at 2. 
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it is appropriate to examine the impact that concepts like 
tribal sovereignty, state jurisdiction in Indian country, and 
federal prosecutorial discretion have had in Indian country. 
II. THE HIGHS AND LOWS OF FEDERAL AND STATE 
INTERACTIONS WITH INDIAN COUNTRY AND TRIBAL EFFORTS 
TO DEVELOP SOUND MARIJUANA PROGRAMS 
This Part offers an introduction to common concepts in 
federal Indian law—such as tribal sovereignty and the 
exercise of state jurisdiction in Indian country. This Part also 
examines how federal and state governments have applied 
the Wilkinson Memo’s policies in relation to several different 
tribal marijuana programs. The latter portions of this Part 
amount to several case studies of the ways that tribes have 
handled the development of marijuana activities and the 
federal and state governments’ enforcement efforts in 
relation to that tribal marijuana activity.  
A.  The Foundations of Federal and State Joint Jurisdiction 
over Indian Country 
Indian tribes have a distinct place in the political and 
governmental system of the United States. The term “Indian 
tribe” means a group, indigenous to North America, “with 
which the United States has established a legal 
relationship.”66 Under federal Indian law, Indian tribes are 
“domestic[,] dependent nations.”67 “They are denominated 
domestic because they are within the United States and 
dependent because they are subject to federal power. They 
are nations because they exercise sovereign powers over the 
people, property, and events within their borders.”68 
 
 66.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 63, § 3.01. 
 67.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). However flawed this 
rationale is, it is, for better or worse, the current state of federal Indian law. 
 68.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 1. 
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Congressional power over Indian affairs is plenary.69 As is 
the case with much of federal Indian law, there are several 
different conceptions of what plenary power means.70 
Gregory Ablavsky offers an apt description of the bifurcated 
meaning of the concept:  
For over a century, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Consti-
tution to grant the federal government “plenary” power over “Indian 
Affairs” . . . . Plenary Power, as used by the Court, has two distinct 
meanings. Sometimes the Court uses the term interchangeably 
with “exclusive,” to describe federal power over Indian affairs to the 
exclusion of states. But the Court also uses the term to describe the 
doctrine that the federal government has unchecked authority over 
Indian tribes, including their internal affairs.71 
The conception of plenary power over Indian affairs 
necessarily has a tenuous relationship with the concept of 
tribal sovereignty. For example, the Supreme Court 
generally recognizes that “Congress possesses plenary power 
over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or 
 
 69.  The authority for the proposition that federal authority is exclusive and 
plenary over Indian affairs has been found by the Supreme Court to be grounded 
in the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and in the Treaty 
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 
559–61 (1832) (clarifying that the Constitution makes tribes subject to federal 
power, not state power). Accordingly, the Court claims that Congress has the 
right to pass legislation that governs Indians and their affairs. See, e.g., Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–68 (1903). Congress’ power to regulate 
commerce with Indian tribes “provides the legal rationale for implementing 
[federal] power” over Indians. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND 
TRIBES 58 (S. Ill. Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2002) (1983). Despite that legal rationale, 
Pevar also contends that “[t]he ultimate source of the federal government’s power 
over Indians is its military strength.” Id.; cf. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the 
Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1015 (2015) (questioning the 
validity of the traditional sources of authority for Congressional plenary power of 
Indian affairs, and noting recent trends toward a change in the doctrine). 
 70.  Justice Thomas summed up this sentiment when he wrote that “[f]ederal 
Indian policy is, to say the least, schizophrenic.” United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 
193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 71.  Ablavsky, supra note 69, at 1014 (emphasis in original).  
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eliminate tribal rights.”72 Even though Indian tribes are 
sovereigns that predate the formation of the United States 
and the Constitution,73 the federal government claims 
exclusive and complete power over Indian affairs. This 
notion of plenary federal power over Indian affairs 
necessarily inhibits tribal governments from exercising a 
genuine and total sovereignty. Although the federal 
government has exclusive “federal power over Indian affairs 
to the exclusion of states,”74 Congress has, by statute, 
actually authorized states to exercise jurisdiction in Indian 
country under certain circumstances.75 State law “can have 
no force” in Indian country without Congress’ consent.76 “The 
policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and 
control is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history.”77 
Nevertheless, Congress can, and has, in some circumstances, 
granted states jurisdiction and control over Indians and 
activities in Indian country. One example of the federal 
government using a statute to grant states jurisdiction over 
 
 72.  South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998). Congress’ 
power to limit or extinguish tribal rights is a longstanding principle in federal 
Indian law. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).  
 73.  Book Discussion on Indian Gaming and Tribal Sovereignty: The Casino 
Compromise, by Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, C-SPAN (Feb. 3, 
2006), http://www.c-span.org/video/?191152-1/book-discussion-indian-gaming-
tribal-sovereignty-casino-compromise (Twenty-two minutes into the discussion, 
Professor Rand refers to the status of tribes as “pre-constitutional and extra-
constitutional” as it relates to the body of federal Indian law that interacts with 
that unique status.).  
 74.  Ablavsky, supra note 69, at 1014. 
 75.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 63, § 6.04. Without a federal grant of civil 
or criminal jurisdiction, states generally lack such jurisdiction over Indians in 
Indian country. See id. § 6.03.  
 76.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).  
 77.  Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945). This oft-cited principle is 
continually reaffirmed in the Supreme Court’s opinions. See, e.g., McClanahan v. 
State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973).  
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Indian country is Public Law 280.78 Congress enacted Public 
Law 280, which granted several states legal authority over 
Indian country.79 Public Law 280 effectively conferred 
extensive criminal jurisdiction and a very limited civil 
jurisdiction over tribal lands within state borders to six 
states, specifically: Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin.80 With respect to civil jurisdiction, 
states were only granted jurisdiction as it may be relevant to 
private civil litigation in a state court.81 Apart from the six 
states specifically granted jurisdiction through Public Law 
280, the statute also provided a method for other states to 
assume jurisdiction over Indian country within their state 
borders if the state chose to assume such jurisdiction.82 
Public Law 280 is only one example of the federal 
government transferring by statute its otherwise exclusive 
power over Indian affairs to state governments. Another 
example of a jurisdictional transfer appears in New York 
where a different set of federal statutes operate to give the 
state partial criminal83 and civil84 jurisdiction on the Indian 
 
 78.  Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326, 28 
U.S.C. § 1360 (2016)).  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360. These states are often referred to 
as “mandatory Public Law 280” jurisdictions because in these jurisdictions the 
statute has removed most federal jurisdiction over Indian country crimes and 
transferred it to the states.  
 81.  28 U.S.C. § 1360. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See 25 U.S.C. § 232 (2016) (“The State of New York shall have jurisdiction 
over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations within the 
State of New York to the same extent as the courts of the State have jurisdiction 
over offenses committed elsewhere within the State.”).  
 84.  25 U.S.C. § 233 (2016) (establishes that the courts of New York State 
“shall have jurisdiction in civil actions and proceedings between Indians or 
between one or more Indians and any other person or persons to the same extent 
as the courts of the State shall have jurisdiction in other civil actions and 
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reservations and territories within New York State.  
B.  How Do Statutory Transfers of Jurisdiction Actually 
Play Out with Real World Events?  
Bryan v. Itasca County, Minnesota was one of the initial 
cases that determined how Public Law 280’s grant of civil 
jurisdiction would operate.85 In Bryan, a state county 
contended that, in addition to granting the state broad 
criminal jurisdiction, Public Law 280 also granted broad civil 
regulatory powers, including the power to impose a personal 
property tax, over the Indians in any part of Indian country 
that was located within Minnesota’s borders.86 The Supreme 
Court rejected that contention and clarified that the civil 
jurisdiction conferred by Public Law 280 was intended only 
to allow state courts to settle private civil suits involving 
Indians by applying “those laws which have to do with 
private rights and status,” such as contract, tort, and divorce 
law.87 Bryan established that although states that have 
jurisdiction over Indian country pursuant to Public Law 280 
have wide latitude regarding criminal jurisdiction, the 
application of state civil laws in Indian country is much 
narrower in scope.88  
A decade later, in the landmark case California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Supreme Court 
addressed the reach of state jurisdiction in Indian country, 
particularly as it relates to tribal gaming enterprises.89 
Within reservation boundaries in the State of California, the 
 
proceedings”).  
 85.  See Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
 86.  Id. at 375–81.  
 87.  Id. at 384 n.10 (quoting Daniel H. Israel & Thomas L. Smithson, Indian 
Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic Development, 49 N.D. L. REV. 267, 
292 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 88.  Id. at 380–81, 384 n.10. 
 89.  California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).  
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Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians operated 
bingo games, and the Cabazon Band also operated a card 
club that offered poker and other card games.90 California 
sought to apply a state statute that strictly controlled the 
operation of bingo games,91 and the county government 
sought to force compliance with an ordinance that prohibited 
card games.92 The Tribes sued in federal court, contending 
that neither the state nor the county had authority to enforce 
gambling laws within the reservations.93 California argued 
that Public Law 280 authorized the state to regulate bingo 
and card games on the reservations.94 The Supreme Court 
rejected California’s contention that Public Law 280 
conferred the requisite authority, and held that the gambling 
laws could not be applied in Indian country.95  
The Court’s reasoning in reaching its conclusion is worth 
careful attention because it can be useful for determining 
how tribes might succeed in crafting marijuana programs 
that are free from state interference.96 The Court reasserted 
the long held principle that “Indian tribes retain ‘attributes 
of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,’” 
and that sovereignty is subordinate exclusively to the federal 
government and not to the states.97 The Court recognized 
 
 90.  Id. at 206.  
 91.  The statute in question, CAL. PENAL CODE § 326.5 (West 1987), did not 
entirely prohibit bingo games within California; rather, it permitted the bingo 
games when they were operated for and by charitable organizations, the profits 
were used only to benefit charitable purposes, and prizes were limited to under 
$250.00 per game. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 205. 
 92.  Id. at 206.  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id. at 207. 
 95.  Id. at 207, 221–22.  
 96.  See infra Section III.B.  
 97.  Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 
544, 557 (1975)).  
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that state laws may apply to tribal Indians on reservations 
only where Congress has expressly transferred that 
authority to the states, as in the case of Public Law 280.98 
The Court noted that Public Law 280 was enacted to 
“combat[ ] lawlessness on reservations” but it was clearly not 
intended to “grant to States [a] general civil regulatory power 
over Indian reservations [because that] would result in the 
destruction of tribal institutions and values.”99 In so stating, 
the Court clarified that an important dichotomy exists 
between laws that are “criminal in nature, and thus fully 
applicable to the reservation[s]” and laws that are “civil in 
nature, and applicable only as it may be relevant to private 
civil litigation.”100 The Court determined that state 
“criminal/prohibitory” laws were fully applicable to 
reservations, but that state “civil/regulatory” laws were not 
generally applicable to reservations.101 The Court outlined 
the contours of this dichotomy: 
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, 
it falls within [Public Law 280’s] grant of criminal jurisdiction, but 
if the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to 
regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and [Public Law 
280] does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation.102 
For the Cabazon Court, the “shorthand test is whether the 
conduct at issue violates the State’s public policy.”103 
The Court next examined the laws that California sought 
to impose on the reservations to determine whether the laws 
were criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory.104 California 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 208. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 209–10.  
 102.  Id. at 209. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Unlike in Bryan, where the imposition of a personal property tax was 
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contended that its restrictions on high stakes bingo were in 
fact prohibitory laws that could be enforced on 
reservations.105 The Court determined that the gambling 
laws were civil/regulatory because California did not prohibit 
all forms of gambling, and in fact California operated its own 
state lottery and “daily encourage[d] its citizens to 
participate in this state-run gambling.”106 Ultimately, the 
Court determined that “[i]n light of the fact that California 
permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, including 
bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state 
lottery, we must conclude that California regulates rather 
than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in 
particular.”107  
With respect to whether the county ordinance 
prohibiting card games could be applied on the reservations, 
the Court noted that it was “doubtful that [Public Law 280] 
authorize[d] the application of any local laws to Indian 
reservations” because Public Law 280 “provides that the 
criminal laws of the ‘State’ shall have the same force and 
effect within Indian country as they have elsewhere.”108 
However, the Court did not expressly decide this issue, 
instead determining that the county card and game 
ordinances, which allowed two municipalities within county 
 
unquestionably a civil law, in Cabazon it was less clear whether California’s 
bingo restrictions were civil or criminal in nature. Id. at 208. 
 105.  The California bingo regulations made it a misdemeanor to conduct high 
stakes bingo under the theory that those games attracted organized crime, and 
because the bingo restrictions were enforced by imposing a criminal charge, they 
should be enforceable as such under Public Law 280. See id. at 211. The Court 
refused to accept this theory, and noted that despite the fact “that an otherwise 
regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as well as civil means does not 
necessarily convert it into a criminal law within the meaning of [Public Law 
280].” Id.  
 106.  Id. at 210.  
 107.  Id. at 211. 
 108.  Id. at 212 n.11.  
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borders to permit gambling on card games, were 
civil/regulatory in nature and thus would not be within the 
purview of Public Law 280’s grant of criminal jurisdiction 
even in the event that county laws could be enforced on the 
reservations.109 
The Tribes’ victory in Cabazon was widely touted as a 
grand success because the Court formally recognized that 
Indian tribes had an inherent right, by virtue of tribal 
sovereignty, to pursue Indian gaming as a means of economic 
development, self-sufficiency, and independence.110 
However, just one year after the decision in Cabazon, 
Congress superseded the effects of the decision by enacting 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).111 IGRA is an act 
of Congress “which gives the states the power to regulate 
certain aspects of Indian gaming but which also allows 
substantial tribal autonomy.”112 IGRA is a “complex and 
comprehensive federal statutory scheme governing the 
regulation of tribal gaming at three levels of government—
tribal, state, and federal.”113 IGRA creates three classes of 
gaming, namely Classes I-III.114 In its most elemental form, 
IGRA provides that: (1) tribes have exclusive control over 
 
 109.  Id.  
 110.  See RALPH A. ROSSUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND TRIBAL GAMING 145–47 
(2011); but cf. PEVAR, supra note 69, at 320.  
 111.  25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2012). Pevar suggests that IGRA was enacted in 
response to the Cabazon decision. PEVAR, supra note 69, at 320. But see STEPHEN 
ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING & TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: 
THE CASINO COMPROMISE 41 (2005) (“Congress already was considering exercising 
its authority to regulate Indian gaming at the federal level.”). Rossum contends 
that describing IGRA as a response to Cabazon is an exaggeration, and that it 
would be more accurate to say that congressional regulation of Indian gaming 
was an ongoing project years before the Cabazon decision. ROSSUM, supra note 
110, at 149–51.  
 112.  PEVAR, supra note 69, at 320.  
 113.  LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 6.  
 114.  PEVAR, supra note 69, at 320–21. 
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Class I gaming; (2) tribes are required to share authority 
over Class II gaming with the state under enumerated 
circumstances; and (3) Class III gaming, which incidentally 
is the most lucrative form of gaming, is subject to extensive 
state regulation.115 The regulatory scheme that controls 
Class III gaming requires tribes to enter into a gaming 
“compact” with the state whereby the “tribe receives the 
state’s express consent to engage in the gaming activity.”116  
A gaming compact is essentially a mechanism devised in 
IGRA that commands the tribe and the state to reach a 
negotiated agreement about the regulatory structure of 
Class III gaming on the tribe’s territory.117 IGRA’s compact 
requirement creates an “active role for states in regulating 
casino-style gaming.”118 States have “considerable leverage” 
over tribes when it comes to negotiating the terms contained 
in the gaming compacts.119 IGRA only requires that the state 
negotiate in “good faith” to reach an agreement with the 
tribe.120 However, in practice, if a state refuses to negotiate 
in good faith, the tribe often has little recourse.121  
C. What Does Indian Gaming Have to Do with Marijuana in 
Indian Country? 
Examining the policies of Indian gaming shows how 
federal and state governments interact with tribal 
 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id. at 321. For a discussion that is beyond the scope of this Comment but 
touches on the important deficiencies in the tribal state compact model, see LIGHT 
& RAND, supra note 111, at 150, 157–61.  
 117.  Id. at 43. 
 118.  Id. at 46. 
 119.  PEVAR, supra note 69, at 322. 
 120.  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2012). 
 121.  See LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 49 (explaining that the enforcement 
mechanism that IGRA provides to ensure that states negotiate in good faith 
“lack[s] teeth”). 
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governments. There are several parallels between Indian 
gaming and tribal marijuana enterprises. For example, the 
legality of each industry varies greatly from state to state. 
Also, Indian gaming has always been seen as a source of 
great economic benefit to tribes,122 and tribal marijuana is 
garnering much attention for its potential to generate 
revenue for tribal economies.123 Most importantly, for 
purposes of this Comment, Indian gaming offers many 
lessons about how federal and state authority can place 
tribal sovereignty in a precarious position. 
Stephen Light and Kathryn Rand are federal Indian law 
scholars and experts in Indian gaming policy. They argue 
that IGRA severely compromises tribal sovereignty because 
it creates a federal and state regulatory structure that serves 
to subjugate an Indian tribe’s ability to exercise its sovereign 
authority to create and maintain Indian gaming 
operations.124 Particularly with respect to IGRA’s 
requirement that tribes enter into tribal/state compacts to 
pursue Class III gaming, Light and Rand have noted that the 
compact structure compromises a tribe’s inherent right to 
exercise tribal sovereignty.125 After all, a tribe’s right to 
conduct Indian gaming is grounded in the exercise of tribal 
 
 122.  The Cabazon Court made much of the fact that tribal gaming provided 
employment on the reservation and that gaming profits provided a revenue 
stream for the Tribes in that case. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 
480 U.S. 202, 205 (1987); see also LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 7 (describing 
Indian gaming as a multi-billion dollar “big business”).  
 123. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, A New Growth Industry for Native Americans: 
Weed, THE ATLANTIC (May 20, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2016/05/weed-to-revive-native-american-reservations/483566/. 
 124.  LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 6–7. 
 125.  Id. at 36 (Through the “process of negotiating tribal-state 
compacts . . . . [t]ribes have been placed in the position of abrogating aspects of 
their inherent sovereignty in order to exercise the sovereign right to open gaming 
establishments.”).  
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sovereignty.126 Compacts infringe on tribal sovereignty 
because the tribe’s decision to engage in gaming as a way to 
generate revenue to fund tribal self-government and self-
determination should be an unimpeded exercise of a 
sovereign right, but instead, under IGRA’s compact 
requirement, tribes are forced to seek the express consent of 
the state to pursue Class III gaming.127  
To make sense of the complicated structure of IGRA and 
its interactions with Indian country, it is helpful to examine 
Light and Rand’s unique definition of tribal sovereignty. For 
Light and Rand, the “heart” of tribal sovereignty is a tribe’s 
“inherent right of self-determination.”128 They also 
characterize tribal sovereignty as encompassing two related 
but distinct concepts.129 First, they separate out the concept 
of “indigenous perspectives” on tribal sovereignty, from a 
second and distinct concept, which they refer to specifically 
as the “federal legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty.”130 From 
an indigenous perspective, “[t]ribal sovereignty stems from 
tribes’ status as self-governing indigenous nations with legal, 
political, cultural, and spiritual authority.”131 From this 
indigenous perspective, an Indian tribe’s inherent right of 
self-determination is respected and provides the very basis 
of every Indian tribe’s “authority to determine membership, 
establish and enforce laws, provide for the health and 
welfare of members, protect and nurture tribal traditions 
 
 126.  IGRA is often mistakenly understood to be the source of an Indian tribe’s 
authority to engage in gaming operations, but in reality, IGRA is a constraint on 
that authority. Id. at 6–7. Cabazon is widely understood to have recognized the 
proposition that Indian tribes have an inherent right to engage in gaming on their 
territory. See, e.g., PEVAR, supra note 69, at 320. 
 127.  PEVAR, supra note 69, at 321.  
 128.  LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 5.  
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
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and culture, and interact with federal and state 
governments.”132 
“The federal legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty” cabins 
away the inherent indigenous aspects of sovereignty and 
instead “reflects a much narrower view of tribal sovereignty 
embedded in more than two hundred years of byzantine 
federal Indian law and policy.”133 The earlier portion of this 
Comment describes how the “much narrower view”134 of 
tribal sovereignty has been exercised by the federal 
government. The federal legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty 
is marked by the notion that “tribal sovereignty may be 
limited or extinguished by Congress” and thus this definition 
“compromises tribal self-determination.”135  
These two different conceptions of tribal sovereignty are 
especially poignant when considering the recent efforts that 
Indian tribes and nations have made to utilize marijuana for 
potential economic benefits. Economic development 
considerations are of central importance to any consideration 
of an Indian government’s right to pursue a marijuana 
program because the economic conditions in Indian country 
are startlingly unsatisfactory. It is worth noting that the 
Cabazon Court gave much attention to economic factors in 
Indian country when it decided that tribes had a right to 
pursue gaming free from the interference of state 
regulations.136 
 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at § 5.02[1]. 
 134.  LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 5. 
 135.  Id.; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214–15, 224–25 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning whether inherent tribal sovereignty and 
congressional plenary power can even exist together or whether they might be 
mutually exclusive concepts). Lara also asserts the principle that the federal 
government can even abolish tribal sovereignty at will. See 541 U.S. at 199–203. 
 136.  California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216–19 
(1987). 
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Indians face poverty at an alarmingly high rate.137 In 
2012, approximately one in four American Indians or Alaska 
Natives were living in poverty.138 In 2014, the U.S. Census 
Bureau recorded that 28.3% of American Indians and Alaska 
Natives were living in poverty.139 That is the highest rate of 
poverty of any race group in the United States, and the 
percentage of American Indians and Alaska Natives living in 
poverty is nearly twice the rate for the nation as a whole.140 
Residents of reservations are generally among the most 
impoverished in the nation.141 
Indian tribes and nations are now attempting to utilize 
the recent trends in marijuana legalization for economic 
development that is so desperately needed.142 In the last 
 
 137.  In 2014, in advance of a visit to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 
reservation in North Dakota, then president Obama authored an op-ed wherein 
he referenced many of the economic struggles facing Indian country and pointed 
out that the rates of poverty, unemployment, and lack of education are 
disproportionately high for Native Americans when compared with national 
averages. See Barack Obama, On My Upcoming Trip to Indian Country, INDIAN 
COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (June 5, 2014), 
https://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/06/05/my-upcoming-trip-
indian-country.  
 138.  Jens Manuel Krogstad, One-in-Four Native Americans and Alaska 
Natives Are Living in Poverty, PEW RES. CTR. (June 13, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/13/1-in-4-native-americans-and-
alaska-natives-are-living-in-poverty.  
 139.  American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 2015, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-
features/2015/cb15-ff22.html. 
 140.  Id. (28.3% of single-race American Indians and Alaska Natives live in 
poverty compared to the national poverty rate of 15.5%). 
 141.  LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 98. The extreme rates of poverty on 
reservations are accompanied by all the social and public health problems 
attendant in impoverished communities, such as: substance abuse, mental health 
problems, domestic violence, infant mortality, suicide, obesity, and high rates of 
other illnesses like diabetes, tuberculosis, and alcoholism. Id. 
 142.  There is no doubt that the Wilkinson Memo and the prospect of 
developing marijuana related industries is seen as a potential economic boon for 
Indian tribes and Indian nations in much the same way that Indian gaming has 
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several decades, Indian gaming has functioned as a major 
economic driver in Indian country.143 Just as IGRA and state 
law have acted as constraints on Indian gaming, so too have 
federal and state marijuana policies acted as constraints on 
the development of tribal marijuana programs. The general 
interest in tapping into a marijuana marketplace to 
rejuvenate tribal economies is likely to be tempered by the 
federal government’s malleable position on its enforcement 
priorities. While the Cole and Wilkinson Memos clearly set 
forth the eight enforcement priorities, the Memos also make 
clear that the DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s Office still have 
complete discretion to enforce the CSA as they see fit.144 That 
means any investment into tribal marijuana activity is a 
risky proposition subject to the discretion and plenary 
authority of the federal government, and in some 
circumstances, subject also to state jurisdiction. For 
example, if a newly elected administration sets forth a 
different, more stringent, DOJ policy regarding marijuana 
activity in Indian country, then any investments in the 
marijuana industry could be a complete wash for Indian 
tribes and Indian nations who eagerly established marijuana 
industries under the current set of guidelines.  
 
 
evolved into a multibillion dollar industry. See, e.g., Carly Schwartz, More Than 
100 Native American Tribes Consider Growing Marijuana, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/03/native-americans-
marijuana_n_6599984.html. 
 143.  Indian Gaming set an industry record in 2012 with over $27 billion in 
revenues. RUBINBROWN LLP, COMMERCIAL & TRIBAL GAMING STATS 1, 14 (2014), 
http://www.rubinbrown.com/RubinBrown_2014_Gaming_Stats.pdf. For 
example, the Oneida Nation of New York runs the highly successful Turning 
Stone Casino Resort, which employs a large number of people, and has created 
revenue that has improved the Oneida’s housing, health care, education, and 
other essential government services. LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 99.  
 144.  See COLE MEMO, supra note 40, at 4; WILKINSON MEMO, supra note 58, at 
2. 
ADORNETTO 65.2  
2017] INDIAN COUNTRY AND MARIJUANA 359 
D.  How Have Marijuana Developments Played Out in 
Indian Country Under the Wilkinson Memo? 
The Squaxin and Suquamish Tribes in Washington have 
entered into marijuana compacts with Washington State.145 
The marijuana compacts govern the production, processing, 
and sale of marijuana on tribal land.146 Washington has a 
very progressive policy regarding marijuana use, including 
legal recreational use.147 Washington’s broad acceptance of 
marijuana use inevitably makes it more accommodating to 
tribal marijuana programs than states with more restrictive 
marijuana laws. The compact model is of course familiar 
because of its use within the Indian gaming industry under 
IGRA, but the use of the compact model is a brand new 
introduction to the emerging tribal marijuana industry.148 In 
the context of Indian gaming, Light and Rand have criticized 
this tribal/state compact model because it compromises a 
tribe’s inherent right to exercise tribal sovereignty.149 Under 
the marijuana compacts in Washington, the Tribes “shall 
impose and maintain a Tribal Tax that is equal to at least 
100 percent of the State Tax on all sales of marijuana 
products in Indian country” to non-tribal members, and the 
 
 145.  Squaxin Island Tribe Enters Marijuana Compact in Washington, 
INDIANZ.COM (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.indianz.com/News/2015/019025.asp. 
For the text of the compact signed between the Suquamish Tribe and Washington 
State, see STATE OF WASH. & SUQUAMISH TRIBE, MARIJUANA COMPACT BETWEEN 
THE SUQUAMISH TRIBE AND THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (2015), 
http://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/Compact-9-14-15.pdf. 
 146.  Id. at 4. 
 147.  See Initiative Measure No. 502, supra note 32. 
 148.  See Hilary Bricken, Smoke Signals: Washington State and Suquamish 
Tribe Ink First Ever Marijuana Compact, ABOVE L. (Sept. 21, 2015), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2015/09/smoke-signals-washington-state-and-
suquamish-tribe-ink-first-ever-marijuana-compact/. 
 149.  LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 36 (“The process of negotiating tribal-
state compacts epitomizes this phenomenon. Tribes have been placed in the 
position of abrogating aspects of their inherent sovereignty in order to exercise 
the sovereign right to open gaming establishments.”).  
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“Tribe agrees to use the proceeds of the Tribal Tax for 
Essential Government Services.”150 While the circumstances 
of this arrangement seem mutually beneficial, the taxing and 
spending terms of this compact are an intrusion into an area 
that would generally be regarded as entirely within the 
province of the tribe’s inherent sovereignty. However, unlike 
the gaming compacts imposed by IGRA, these marijuana 
compacts are not as likely to compromise tribal sovereignty. 
Where IGRA imposes the compact requirement if tribes want 
to pursue Class III gaming, there is no such governing 
statute for the marijuana industry in Indian country. Thus, 
by choosing to enter into a marijuana compact with 
Washington, the Squaxin and Suquamish Tribes have not 
had to compromise their inherent sovereignty to the same 
extent as would be required by a gaming compact under 
IGRA. 
In New York, members of the Seneca Nation of Indians 
approved, by voter referendum, a plan for the Nation to 
proceed with the adoption of a medical cannabis 
ordinance.151 New York has a highly restrictive medical 
cannabis law.152 Thus, the Nation is subject to a de facto limit 
on how far the Seneca Nation can move on its own marijuana 
policy because it must conform to New York’s highly 
 
 150.  STATE OF WASH. & SUQUAMISH TRIBE, supra note 145, at 7–8. Under the 
compact, “‘Essential Government Services’ means services provided by the Tribe 
including, but not limited to, administration, public facilities, fire, police, health, 
education, elder care, social services, sewer, water, environmental and land use, 
transportation, utility services, community development, and economic 
development.” Id. at 3. 
 151.  Dale Anderson, Seneca Nation Votes to Explore Business of Medical 
Marijuana, BUFF. NEWS (Nov. 3 2015), http://www.buffalonews.com/city-
region/politics/seneca-nation-votes-to-explore-business-of-medical-marijuana-
20151103.  
 152.  See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3360–3369 (McKinney 2016). The law is 
colloquially referred to as the Compassionate Care Act of 2014.  
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restrictive marijuana policies153 if it hopes to avoid the 
troubles that have befallen the tribes discussed below.154  
The Alturas Indian Rancheria and Pit River Tribes, 
which are considered separate federally recognized tribes but 
share common ancestry, each legalized marijuana following 
the Wilkinson Memo.155 Each tribe set up a separate grow 
operation on separate sites near Alturas, California.156 In 
July 2015, the Tribes’ marijuana operations were raided and 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of 
California included the following in its press release: 
[S]pecial agents with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), assisted by other federal and 
state agencies and the Modoc County Sheriff’s Office, conducted a 
search of two large-scale marijuana cultivation facilities located on 
federally recognized tribal lands. . . . At both sites, law enforcement 
seized a total of at least 12,000 marijuana plants and over 100 
pounds of processed marijuana. . . . [N]o [other] tribal property was 
seized, and no federal charges are pending.157 
In the press release, the U.S. Attorney’s Office identified 
the problems with the tribal marijuana operations that 
 
 153.  See id. For example, New York does not permit smoked marijuana, and 
the list of conditions qualifying for medical use is restrictive and includes only 
those conditions defined as “serious” in § 3360(7).  
 154.  In New York, under 25 U.S.C. § 232, both the federal and state 
governments have concurrent criminal jurisdiction over Indian country, thus 
allowing either the federal or state governments, under appropriate 
circumstances, to bring enforcement actions against the Seneca Nation for its 
marijuana policy. See 25 U.S.C. § 232 (2012). 
 155.  Julian Brave NoiseCat, These Native American Tribes Legalized Weed, 
but That Didn’t Stop Them from Getting Raided by the Feds, HUFFINGTON POST 
(July 18, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/pit-river-marijuana-
raid_us_55a938cfe4b0f904bebfe52a. 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Federal and Local Law Enforcement Execute Search Warrants at Large 
Scale Commercial Marijuana Cultivation Facilities on Tribal Lands, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. (July 8, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-edca/pr/federal-and-local-law-
enforcement-execute-search-warrants-large-scale-commercial.  
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warranted the raids on sovereign tribal land.158 First, one of 
the grow sites was located next to an interstate highway and 
the Pit River.159 Second, both of the grow operations far 
exceeded the grow cultivation limits applicable to county 
land.160 Lastly, tribal representatives said that the 
marijuana was to be distributed off tribal land but it was 
unclear, specifically, where the vast amount of marijuana 
was going to be distributed.161 The press release explains 
which of the eight Cole Memo enforcement priorities were 
implicated by the Tribes’ activities: “the diversion of 
marijuana to places where it is not authorized and potential 
threats to public safety, both of which are listed priorities in 
Department of Justice guidelines.”162 According to the press 
release, the U.S. Attorney’s Office tried to consult with the 
tribal representatives before resorting to the raid.163 In the 
case of the Alturas Indian Rancheria and Pit River Tribes, a 
failure to accommodate the discretionary list of enforcement 
priorities and a failure to communicate with federal agents, 
coupled with a grow operation that exceeded state strictures, 
yielded a massive raid. 
Perhaps the most well-advertised marijuana plans in 
Indian country in the year following the Wilkinson Memo 
were to be undertaken by the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe. 
In June 2015, the Tribe legalized marijuana.164 The Tribe 
had plans to open a marijuana resort on its reservation lands 
that would include a smoking lounge with a nightclub, bar 
 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id. 
 164. Bridget Bennett, Flandreau Santee Sioux Reservation Legalizes 
Marijuana, KSFY (June 15, 2015), http://www.ksfy.com/home/headlines/
Flandreau-Santee-Sioux-Reservation-legalizes-marijuana-307470861.html. 
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and food service, and more.165 The plan was to have a New 
Year’s Eve party to launch the new business venture, and in 
September 2015, the Tribal President Anthony Reider was 
quoted saying, “[w]e want it to be an adult playground.”166 
The Tribe, whose reservation is located in South Dakota,167 
partnered with Monarch America, a Colorado-based 
consulting firm that offered assurances that the Tribe’s 
marijuana operation was clean, efficient, proficient, safe, and 
secure.168 Nevertheless, by November 2015 the Tribal 
Council169 voted to temporarily suspend the marijuana 
operation and set the entire marijuana crop ablaze.170  
The shocking aspect of this tribal action is that it seems 
to have been prompted as part of the Tribe’s ongoing 
relationship with state and federal governments. Tribal 
officials were in consultation with federal officials at the time 
that the Tribal Council voted to suspend the marijuana 
operation. The Tribe’s attorney, Seth Pearman, said in a 
statement: 
After government-to-government consultation with the United 
States, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe is temporarily suspending 
 
 165.  Regina Garcia Cano, South Dakota Tribe to Open Nation’s 1st Marijuana 
Resort, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/marijuana/south-dakota-tribe-to-open-nations-1st-marijuana-resort/. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Marijuana is illegal in South Dakota. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-42-6 to -7 
(2016).  
 168.  Cano, supra note 165. 
 169.  “Tribal Councils are the elected lawmaking bodies of tribal governments,” 
and generally have broad authority over a wide range of subjects. COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at § 4.04[3][c][ii]. 
 170.  Sarah Sunshine Manning, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe Burns Crop, 
Suspends Marijuana Operation, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Nov. 8, 2015), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/11/08/flandreau-santee-
sioux-tribe-burns-crop-suspends-marijuana-operation-162363. Let us not miss 
the opportunity to enjoy the irony in this solution to a marijuana enforcement 
problem.  
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its marijuana cultivation and distribution facilities. This suspen-
sion is pivotal to the continued success of the marijuana venture, 
and Tribal leadership is confident that after seeking clarification 
from the United States Department of Justice, it will be better 
suited to succeed. The Tribe will continue to consult with the federal 
and state governments, and hopes to be granted parity with states 
that have legalized marijuana. The Tribe intends to successfully 
participate in the marijuana industry, and Tribal leadership is un-
daunted by this brief sidestep.171 
This statement reveals that the current state of the law 
promotes stagnation rather than progress. The Tribe’s 
options were so constrained by federal and state policy that 
the only way to prevent total loss of the investment in the 
marijuana business was to suspend the current marijuana 
operation and destroy the existing product to prevent a more 
comprehensive loss brought on by a federal or state raid. 
Tribal Councilmember172 Kenny Weston is quoted as saying, 
“[w]e made an investment, and we have to continue to protect 
that investment while legislation catches up to the current 
times.”173 Councilmember Weston’s statement perfectly 
captures the problematic state of the law on marijuana 
activity in Indian country; despite guidance offered by the 
Cole and Wilkinson Memos, federal law is in fact perpetually 
playing catch up with the smaller jurisdictions within our 
national borders.  
This tribal reaction shows what an untenable holding 
pattern Indian country is in with regard to the potential 
investment benefits and economic development 
opportunities associated with the marijuana industry. With 
respect to the Santee Sioux Tribe’s predicament, the Office 
of the South Dakota Attorney General released a statement:  
 
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Tribal Councilmembers are the individual members who are elected to 
sit on the Tribal Councils. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 63, at 
§ 4.04[3][c][ii]. 
 173.  Manning, supra note 170. 
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The possession, distribution and manufacture of marijuana is a vi-
olation of both federal and state law. Unfortunately, the federal gov-
ernment has created confusion in relation to marijuana jurisdiction 
in Indian Country with recent inconsistencies. . . . “I want to en-
courage Tribal leaders to continue to work with state authorities to 
better ensure our respective laws are followed . . . and that both In-
dian and non-Indian persons are not put in harm’s way by the ju-
risdiction complexities being created by our federal government,” 
said [South Dakota] Attorney General Jackley.174 
In this statement, the South Dakota Attorney General 
quite squarely rebuffs the federal government’s policy 
position on marijuana in Indian country. In this scenario, a 
tribe made an investment in response to the Wilkinson 
Memo, hired viable consultants, and was responsive to 
federal and state cautions. The result, however, was a stalled 
investment, a wasted product, and a lost opportunity. The 
Santee Sioux Tribe, in this instance, was unable to capitalize 
on the promising investment opportunity associated with a 
vibrant marijuana industry. Even though the complex 
concept of tribal sovereignty ought to grant some right of self-
determination,175 Indian tribes are nevertheless subject to 
the plenary power of the federal government, the 
discretionary guidance of the eight enforcement priorities in 
the Wilkinson Memo, and the capricious flux in the law that 
comes as a result of the federal government’s inability to 







 174.  Jurisdiction over Marijuana in South Dakota and Our Reservations, OFF. 
S.D. ATT’Y GEN., https://atg.sd.gov/OurOffice/Media/pressreleasesdetail. aspx? 
id=1377 (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).  
 175.  LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 5. 
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III. TOKEN SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE FEDERAL, STATE, AND 
TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS CAN BEST APPROACH THE INTRICACIES 
OF MARIJUANA PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
A.  The Times They Are A-Changin’176 
Congress should act to reschedule marijuana. In the 
bygone days of 2009, then President Obama joked during a 
town hall meeting about the massive number of questions he 
had received from young people who wanted him to address 
the notion that legalizing marijuana might act as a viable 
economic stimulus policy.177 Well, today, it is not just young 
cannabis-crazy hipsters who are proposing that the federal 
government ought to reconsider its marijuana policies. Now 
it is U.S. Senators like Kirsten Gillibrand and Cory Booker 
who are calling on the federal government to act to update 
its anachronistic marijuana laws and policies.178 During his 
senate confirmation hearings, Jeff Sessions made remarks 
that indicated the need for Congress to change the CSA to 
better conform to the realities of marijuana activities in the 
United States. A Republican Senator from Utah, Mike Lee, 
asked Sessions to comment on the incongruence between 
marijuana policies at the state level compared with the 
federal government’s complete prohibition of marijuana at 
the federal level. In reply, Sessions explained that “one 
obvious concern is that the United States Congress has made 
the possession of marijuana in every state and distribution 
of it an illegal act . . . if that something is not desired any 
longer, Congress should pass a law to change the rule.”179 
 
 176.  BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-
CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1964).  
 177.  Sam Stein, Obama Takes Pot Legalization Question During Townhall, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/
26/obama-takes-pot-legalizat_n_179563.html.  
 178.  See supra notes 1–9. 
 179.  Attorney General Confirmation Hearing, Day 1 Part 2, supra note 13 
(relevant questioning occurs between 1:21:11 and 1:25:50). 
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Here, at least, Sessions offers good advice. Congress must 
recognize that the slew of ballot measures and legislation 
approving legal marijuana at the state level is evidence of a 
nationwide desire to allow for legal use and effective 
regulation of marijuana. Senators from both sides of the aisle 
have called on Congress to change federal law, and as such, 
Congress should act to change the CSA’s position on 
marijuana so that the nation’s laws more closely 
approximate the realities of marijuana activities in the 
United States today. 
B.  The Cabazon Concepts Should Control 
Whenever a state government or law enforcement 
agency considers bringing a marijuana enforcement action in 
Indian country, the state should, at the very least, consider 
the Court’s reasoning in Cabazon. Where the state has 
legalized marijuana subject to regulation, the state should 
not interfere with tribal governments that do the same. As 
was the case with Indian gaming, there is a general buzz 
surrounding Indian country’s efforts to develop marijuana 
programs and the potential economic development benefits 
that could abound. The Cabazon Court made clear that for 
tribes, “[s]elf-determination and economic development are 
not within reach if the Tribes cannot raise revenues and 
provide employment for their members.”180 If, as those like 
Light and Rand suggest, tribal sovereignty is a tribe’s 
inherent right of self-determination, then once a tribe has 
determined that its members will benefit from pursuing a 
marijuana program, the state should not act to interfere with 
that program unless it represents a flagrant violation of the 
state’s public policy.181  
Additionally, in Cabazon the Court noted that the 
 
 180.  California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 219 (1987). 
 181.  See id. at 209.  
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federal government had encouraged Indian gaming as a 
means of developing tribal economies.182 The Court 
explained that it is important to consider “traditional notions 
of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian 
self-government, including its ‘overriding goal’ of 
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic 
development.”183 With these concepts in mind, the Wilkinson 
Memo can act as a guidepost to any state that considers 
bringing an enforcement action in Indian country. If a tribal 
marijuana program complies with the Cole Memo, then the 
federal government is not likely to exercise its discretion to 
pursue marijuana enforcement efforts. Even where Congress 
has granted a statutory basis for a state to exercise 
jurisdiction in Indian country, the state should heed the 
federal government’s enforcement priorities, regardless of 
the state’s own position, because the traditional “policy of 
leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is 
deeply rooted in the Nation’s history.”184 Thus, if the DOJ, 
under the Cole factors, would be unlikely to bring an 
enforcement action against a tribal marijuana activity, then 
the state should not exercise any of its jurisdiction in Indian 
country.  
Ultimately, Cabazon held that states do not have a 
civil/regulatory authority over Indian country.185 Cabazon, 
as it can be construed to apply to tribal marijuana programs, 
should stand for the proposition that if a state chooses to 
permit marijuana activity, subject to state regulatory 
 
 182.  The federal government helped finance the development of tribal gaming 
enterprises, helped approve tribal gaming ordinances, and reviewed 
management contracts for gaming enterprises. Id. at 218.  
 183.  Id. at 216 (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 
334–35 (1983)).  
 184.  Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945). This is an oft-cited principle 
continually reaffirmed in the Supreme Court’s opinions. See, e.g., McClanahan v. 
State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973) (quoting Rice, 324 U.S. at 
789).  
 185.  Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209–10. 
ADORNETTO 65.2  
2017] INDIAN COUNTRY AND MARIJUANA 369 
authority, then it does not have the power to criminalize or 
regulate marijuana activity on tribal lands. 
Allowing Cabazon to control the effects of state 
marijuana policy over Indian country does not resolve all the 
tenuous issues. For example, when a reservation is located 
within a state that has criminal jurisdiction over that 
reservation, the tribe cannot freely pursue marijuana 
legalization if the state has not yet done so, or at least not 
without fear of being the subject of an enforcement action by 
the state. Essentially, the tribe must first wait for a state to 
decriminalize marijuana before the tribe can take haven in 
Cabazon’s civil/regulatory and criminal/prohibitory 
dichotomy. And so, in those cases, tribes are subject to the 
public policy determinations of the state. That inherently 
usurps some of the tribe’s sovereignty. For example, in South 
Dakota, where marijuana is still illegal under state law,186 
tribes within that boundary are not able to pursue marijuana 
programs as freely as they might be in a state with more 
progressive marijuana policy. At this moment, when the 
nation’s marijuana policy is so fragmented, the concepts set 
forth in Cabazon function as a useful starting point for 
determining when states ought not to interfere with tribal 
marijuana programs.  
C.  The Trouble with the Cole Factors in Indian Country  
Another problem that needs to be addressed is the 
operation of the third Cole factor in Indian country. The Cole 
Memo makes it a federal enforcement priority to prevent “the 
diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under 
state law in some form to other states.”187 Presumably, the 
Cole factors were not written in consideration of the 
geographic realities of Indian country, where the Indian 
 
 186.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-42-6 to -7 (2016). 
 187.  COLE MEMO, supra note 40, at 1.  
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territory at issue is essentially an island of Indian country 
situated within the greater state boundaries.188 The 
Wilkinson Memo simply re-appropriated the existing set of 
priorities and made them applicable in Indian country.189 As 
stated above, the third Cole factor makes it an enforcement 
priority to prevent the diversion of marijuana from a place 
where it is legal to places where it is illegal. Does that mean 
that the factor will automatically be triggered if a marijuana 
program operated in Indian country is legal under tribal law, 
but the tribe’s territory is surrounded by a state that 
prohibits marijuana?190 This risk constrains tribes and 
interferes with the tribal right to self-determination. The 
DOJ should issue a clarification that more adequately 
addresses the features of an on-territory tribal marijuana 
program where the tribe’s territory is subsumed within a 
state where marijuana is illegal.  
D.  Nip IGRA in the Bud  
As this Comment suggests, there are some similarities 
between the Indian gaming industry and the development of 
tribal marijuana enterprises. Those similarities should not 
lead the federal government to create a regulatory scheme 
for tribal marijuana that duplicates IGRA’s grant of state 
regulatory control over Indian gaming. The federal 
government could someday act to reschedule, legalize, or 
regulate marijuana. If that does occur, the federal 
government should maintain its plenary power over Indian 
country to the exclusion of the states. The tribal/state 
gaming compact provisions under IGRA should not be 
 
 188.  I borrowed this idea of the problems of “legalization on an island” from a 
prominent Indian law blog. Lael Echo-Hawk, Cannabis in Indian Country—A 
Year Later…, SMOKE SIGNALS (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.smokesignalsindian
law.com/2016/01/28/cannabis-in-indian-country-a-year-later/.  
 189.  WILKINSON MEMO, supra note 58, at 2.  
 190.  See COLE MEMO, supra note 40, at 1. 
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replicated in the context of tribal marijuana development 
because gaming compacts effectively granted the states an 
“active role” in regulating the gaming industry in Indian 
country.191 The federal government should not enact a 
statutory scheme that allows states to have the considerable 
regulatory leverage that the gaming compact model has 
wrought under the reign of IGRA. After all, Cabazon asserts 
“a grant to States of general civil regulatory power over 
Indian reservations would result in the destruction of tribal 
institutions and values.”192 Furthermore, “[t]he policy of 
leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is 
deeply rooted in the Nation’s history.”193 As Light and Rand 
argue, a federal statute that requires tribes to submit to 
compact negotiations with a state government is a 
debasement of tribal sovereignty. The federal government’s 
plenary authority over Indian affairs already subjects tribes 
to the strictures of the Cole Memo or any subsequent federal 
marijuana policy. The federal government should not further 
infringe on the tribal right of self-determination by granting 
state jurisdiction over Indian marijuana activity as it did 
with Indian gaming under IGRA. Rather, if tribal 
governments determine that a compact relationship with the 
state makes good political or economic sense, the tribe may 
pursue that avenue of its own accord. The examples of the 
marijuana compacts in Washington demonstrate how a tribe 







 191.  LIGHT & RAND, supra note 111, at 44. 
 192.  California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987). 
 193.  Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945). 
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E. Tribal Governments: Be Cautious and Promote 
Marijuana Development as an Exercise of Tribal 
Sovereignty 
The takeaways from the experiences of tribes that are 
already operating marijuana activities is that a great deal 
depends on the legal status of marijuana in the state in 
which the tribe is located. As in the case of the Santee Sioux 
Tribe,194 moving ahead of South Dakota’s prosaic marijuana 
law, and in the case of the Alturas Indian Rancheria and Pit 
River Tribes,195 moving ahead of even county law, can have 
consequences. Tribes risk a total loss of investment resources 
and product if a marijuana operation is the subject of a 
federal or state enforcement action. An ongoing dialogue and 
transparent discourse with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the 
area, and with state and local prosecutors and law 
enforcement, is a necessary ingredient if tribes wish to 
succeed in the marijuana trade. However, such a dialogue is 
no guarantee that a tribe’s investment is secure against 
enforcement from federal, state, or local authorities.  
The indigenous perspectives on tribal sovereignty and 
self-determination provide a genuine and authoritative 
foundation from which to engage in marijuana production. 
As tribes pursue marijuana developments, the tribes 
effectively embody their inherent status as self-governing 
indigenous nations that have legal, political, cultural, and 
economic authority to determine their own futures and the 
future of marijuana in Indian country. 
CONCLUSION 
The slow burn of the marijuana policy debates at the 
federal and state level reaches a fever pitch when those 
debates begin to take into account the marijuana 
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developments occurring in Indian country. As the laws stand 
now, tribes seeking to minimize the risk of federal 
prosecution can craft regulations that advance the eight 
enforcement priorities of the Cole and Wilkinson Memos. 
Furthermore, Light and Rand’s concepts and suggestions for 
preserving and prioritizing the indigenous perspectives on 
tribal sovereignty as tribes’ inherent right of self-
determination should be allowed to govern the foundations 
of marijuana activity in Indian country. Crucially, the 
federal government should take action to establish a viable 
marijuana policy that effectively recognizes and addresses 
the virtual legality of marijuana activity, rather than the 
nascent state of the discretionary guidelines offered in the 
Cole and Wilkinson Memos. Traditional notions of federal 
Indian law and policy generally encourage the states to 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over tribal marijuana 
operations. 
Tribal marijuana programs will proceed most 
successfully when the federal and state marijuana laws are 
more unified and more fully clarified for application in 
Indian country. Finally, the development of marijuana 
activity in Indian country offers an opportunity for the 
federal and state governments to respect indigenous 
perspectives on tribal sovereignty so that marijuana 
development in Indian country can act as a conduit for tribal 
self-sufficiency, independence, and economic prosperity. 
